

# DECLUSTERING THE ITRUST SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL NETWORK TO INCREASE TRUSTWORTHINESS

Christopher M. Badger, Louise E. Moser, P. Michael Melliar-Smith,  
Isai Michel Lombera, Yung-Ting Chuang  
*Departments of Computer Science and of Electrical and Computer Engineering*  
*University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA*  
*christopherbadger@umail.ucsb.edu, [moser, pmms, imichel, ytchuang]@ece.ucsb.edu*

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Abstract: The iTrust search and retrieval network aims to provide trustworthy access to information on the Web by making it difficult to censor or filter information. The declustering algorithm, presented in this paper, randomizes the network in a manner that reduces the clustering, or cliquishness, of the network. This randomization also reduces the necessary amount of cooperation between nodes by ensuring that a connection to any node is short-lived and can be replaced with a connection to another node from a large pool of known peers. Thus, the declustering algorithm reduces the expectation of cooperation among peers, which represents the degree to which the nodes rely on, or act on, information provided by their peers. In general, the smaller the expectation of cooperation, the less susceptible the network is to malicious attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the declustering algorithm succeeds in randomizing the neighbors of a node in the network and, thus, in reducing the likelihood of malicious attacks.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks (Wikipedia, 2011a) have grown to have large user bases, more than 150 million users in recent years (i-Safe America, 2011). To manage their ever increasing numbers of users, P2P networks have employed a myriad of clever methods to increase scalability and efficiency. Those methods often relate to the way in which the peers connect to each other in the overlay network, or in how the peers search for information in the network. They usually depend on some form of centralized management and control of the overlay network, even when the underlying network is peer-to-peer. However, if a network needs to be resilient to censorship and malicious attacks, those methods might not be appropriate or adequate. The core assumptions that are made in existing P2P networks do not hold in a P2P network that has robustness as its primary goal. The assumptions that a majority of the nodes in a P2P network are cooperative, and that only a small minority of the nodes are subversive, might no longer hold; in fact, just the opposite might be true.

In response to these concerns, and to reduce dependence on centralized search engines for the Web, we have created a P2P system called iTrust (Chuang

et al., 2011; Michel Lombera et al., 2011). iTrust is based on the concept that large companies like Google and Yahoo! might not be unbiased in the search results they provide and that alternatives need to be available. Furthermore, other powerful entities, *e.g.* repressive governments, might censor or disable systems, such as search engines, that are capable of providing unrestricted access to information on the Web. To combat these threats, iTrust aims to provide reliable information search and retrieval that cannot easily be censored or disabled, as well as a robust network that is resilient to malicious attacks. iTrust provides these services by using probabilistic information dissemination techniques in addition to declustering, a heuristic that iTrust peers can use to help randomize their neighbors in the overlay network.

The declustering algorithm uses randomization to reduce the clustering, or cliquishness, of the network. This randomization also reduces the necessary amount of cooperation between nodes by ensuring that a connection to any node is short-lived and can be replaced with a connection to another node from a large pool of known peers. In other words, using randomization, the declustering algorithm reduces the expectation of cooperation among peers, which represents the degree to which the nodes rely on, or act on,

information provided by their peers. In general, the smaller the expectation of cooperation, the less susceptible the network is to malicious attacks.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the methods commonly used in P2P networks and discusses why they are not applicable to a network with iTrust's objectives. Section 3 provides an overview of iTrust, including how iTrust exploits randomization to distribute metadata and requests for information. Section 4 introduces our novel declustering algorithm, which can be used to maintain certain properties of iTrust's overlay network. Section 5 includes results from simulations of iTrust with the declustering algorithm, for several different kinds of networks and analyzes their significance with respect to the goals of iTrust. Finally, Section 6 presents conclusions and future work.

## 2 RELATED WORK

### 2.1 P2P Networks

Although most P2P networks have some similarities, they are often differentiated by two key factors: centrality and structure.

*Centrality* is the degree to which a network relies on specific nodes. A network is centralized if it requires a single dedicated server to function, whereas a network is a pure P2P network (the opposite of centralized) if all nodes are of equal importance. In between these two kinds of P2P networks are hybrid P2P networks, which might have a hierarchy of nodes where the nodes at different levels of the hierarchy have different levels of importance. One of the first and best known examples of a hybrid P2P network is the enhanced Gnutella network (Gnutella, 2000; Rasti et al., 2006), which is discussed in more detail below.

*Structure* is the extent to which the P2P overlay network is managed. Management can be as simple as a set of rules governing connections between nodes, or as complex as an environment that guarantees where information resides in the network. Networks in which the overlay network is heavily controlled are referred to as *structured*, whereas networks with little or no control over the overlay network are referred to as *unstructured*. An example of a structured P2P network is the Chord network (Stoica et al., 2001); Chord employs a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), which is discussed in more detail below.

#### 2.1.1 Gnutella

Gnutella (Gnutella, 2000) with its enhancements (Rasti et al., 2006) is of interest, because it can be classified as a hybrid P2P network. Although the

network is decentralized, it has so-called *ultrapeer nodes* that form a backbone for the other nodes. Ultrapeers are more or less regular nodes that have sufficient computation and communication resources and that choose to promote themselves to ultrapeer status. On reaching ultrapeer status, a node connects itself to other ultrapeers in order to extend the backbone. An ultrapeer collects data about its leaf (non-ultrapeer) neighbors, so that it can propagate queries, and so that it can respond to queries in the leaf node's stead, passing a message to a leaf node only when necessary. This combination of roles dramatically increases the scalability of the Gnutella network.

However, this convenience comes at a cost. Ultrapeers become prime targets for attacks, because the loss of an ultrapeer can disproportionately harm the network. Moreover, if a node connects to only malicious ultrapeers, it can become completely isolated from the rest of the network. Of these two vulnerabilities, the former reduces the robustness of the network to targeted attacks (Albert et al., 2000), whereas the latter allows for easier censorship. The Gnutella network has enjoyed a large measure of success; however, these characteristics make it unsuitable as a network whose primary objective is trustworthy information search and retrieval, without censorship or filtering of information.

#### 2.1.2 Freenet

Another P2P network of interest, especially because its goals are similar to those of iTrust, is Freenet (Clarke et al., 2000). Like iTrust, Freenet is concerned with limiting censorship by providing a means for information to be accessed reliably in a distributed manner. It attempts to achieve this goal by using its own routing protocol, which routes requests to nodes that have been observed to do well with similar requests. An advantage of the Freenet routing protocol is that it does not require any network-wide information or structure to be applied by an individual node; the same is true of the iTrust declustering algorithm, which attempts to randomize nodes in the network and reduce the severity of malicious attacks. Although both techniques are used to increase the effectiveness of their respective P2P networks, the aim of iTrust's declustering algorithm along with probabilistic search is to mitigate the effects of malicious attacks, whereas Freenet's routing protocol provides efficient routing but might be overly optimistic when considering the number of possibly malicious nodes present in the network.

#### 2.1.3 Distributed Hash Tables

Another common approach to building P2P networks involves the use of an organizational structure called a

Distributed Hash Table (DHT), such as that of Chord (Stoica et al., 2001). In essence, DHTs use a specific type of function that maps a keyspace onto the nodes in the network. Every node in the network becomes responsible for a set of keys that are mapped to it. Clever mappings are used to create a strict ordering between keys and the nodes responsible for the keys, allowing the node responsible for a key and the target information to be found quickly. Moreover, when a node joins or leaves the network, only adjacent nodes are affected, where adjacency is determined by the ordering of the key/value pairs. This last property minimizes the work necessary during network churn, joins and leaves, and provides excellent scalability.

Despite these advantages, DHTs have a significant weakness in that, if a malicious node gains control over a target area of the keyspace, it becomes responsible for a portion of the keys in the network and can refuse searches based on those keys. This vulnerability enables an attacker to take a strategic position in the network and censor a particular key or set of keys. Although DHTs are often used in completely decentralized networks that, otherwise, are difficult to attack, the ability to censor specific information is the problem that iTrust is designed to defeat.

## 2.2 Random Networks

Much research has been done on random networks, and two properties have emerged, the small-world effect and the power-law degree distribution.

The *small-world effect* is the property that there exist short paths between any pair of nodes in the network. Many years ago (Milgram, 1967), it was shown that the small-world effect applies to social networks, and that individuals are adept at finding such short paths using only their local neighborhood information. We aim for a similar effect in iTrust. A node maintains connections to only a small number of peer nodes, which form its neighborhood. The neighbors of a node forward messages generated by the node to their neighbors.

The *power-law degree distribution* (Wikipedia, 2011b) is the property that the probability of the node degree varies as a power of the degree. This property results when networks expand continuously by the addition of new nodes, and new nodes attach preferentially to already well-connected nodes (Barabási and Albert, 1999). Power law networks concentrate many connections at a relatively small number of nodes, which is a disadvantage for iTrust, because malicious manipulation of such highly connected nodes might distort the distribution of information. iTrust aims for networks in which all nodes are equal, which will not happen by chance but is an explicit objective of iTrust.

To comply with both the small-world effect and the power-law degree distribution, several researchers (Makowiec, 2005; Ree, 2006) proposed rewiring a constant-size network based on the preferential attachment of new nodes to already well-connected nodes. Likewise, in our declustering algorithm, we consider a relatively small neighborhood of a node and rewire it, but for the purposes of achieving randomization and resistance to malicious attacks.

In our experiments and results presented in Section 5, we consider the Erdős-Rényi, Barabási-Albert, and Watts-Strogatz networks in the context of our declustering algorithm for iTrust. We briefly introduce these networks below.

### 2.2.1 Erdős-Rényi Network

The Erdős-Rényi network is a classic random network, where any two nodes are connected according to a fixed probability. Because every edge has an equal chance of existing, independent of all other edges, the degree of any node follows a binomial distribution (Erdős and Rényi, 1960).

### 2.2.2 Watts-Strogatz Network

The Watts-Strogatz network is initially constructed by placing nodes on one or more dimensional regular lattices, *e.g.* circle or grid, and connecting each node to its  $n$  nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the model adds random rewiring of edges so that the resulting network has a small diameter (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Real networks have been observed to have small diameters (Travers and Milgram, 1969). When the rewiring probability is chosen to be zero, the network is identical to the original lattice.

### 2.2.3 Barabási-Albert Network

The Barabási-Albert network is created incrementally by preferentially attaching new nodes to already well-connected nodes (Barabási and Albert, 1999). This process leads to a graph with a power-law degree distribution. Many real networks have degrees that follow a heavy-tail power law degree distribution.

## 3 THE ITRUST P2P NETWORK

To address potential Internet censorship and other problems associated with centralized search engines, as well as to avoid the aforementioned P2P network vulnerabilities, we are developing the iTrust P2P network (Chuang et al., 2011; Michel Lombera et al., 2011). iTrust is intended to be robust against attacks as well as capable of disseminating information even




Figure 1: The iTrust random, probabilistic search strategy.

in the presence of attempts to suppress it, *i.e.*, iTrust is intended to be censorship resistant. iTrust attains these goals by making use of a random, probabilistic search strategy.

The nodes that participate in an iTrust network are referred to as the *participating nodes* or the *membership* (Figure 1(a)). Some of the participating nodes, the *source nodes*, produce information, and make that information available to other participating nodes (Figure 1(b)). The source nodes also produce metadata that describes their information, and distribute the metadata, along with the URL of the information, to a subset of the participating nodes chosen at random. Other participating nodes, the *requesting nodes*, request and retrieve information. Such nodes generate requests that contain keywords, and distribute the requests to a subset of the participating nodes chosen at random (Figure 1(c)). Nodes that receive a request compare the keywords in the request with the metadata they hold. If a node finds a match, which we call an *encounter*, the matching node returns the URL of the associated information to the requesting node (Figure 1(d)). The requesting node then uses the URL

to retrieve the information from the source node. A *match* between the keywords in a request received by a node and the metadata held by the node might be an exact match or a partial match, or might correspond to synonyms.

In iTrust, each node maintains a list of cooperating peers, nodes that distribute metadata and that issue search requests. Every node needs such a list from which to draw random subsets of nodes for distribution of metadata and requests. In our existing implementation of iTrust (Chuang et al., 2011; Michel Lombera et al., 2011), all nodes maintain a list of substantially all participating nodes, which works quite well for memberships of a few hundred or thousand participating nodes. For memberships of millions of participating nodes, the cost of the membership list, and the cost of maintaining the membership, as nodes join and leave the membership, can become excessive. Consequently, in this paper, we investigate P2P networks in which each node holds a list of participating nodes that form a small, random subset of the membership, *i.e.*, a *neighborhood* of the node. Because it can be difficult to ascertain whether a given

node is cooperative or malicious, we must ensure that the subset is sufficiently random. By making a random choice of a subset from the list of known participating nodes, attempts to poison the list with a large number of malicious nodes can be mitigated.

Even unstructured networks, such as iTrust, can develop many unwanted features when left to their own devices. Real networks tend to form cliques and have degree distributions that follow a power law (Adamic et al., 2001; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Cliques are undesirable, because they can decrease the efficacy of searches and can compartmentalize the network. Degree distributions that follow power laws tend to have a few hub nodes that become single points of failure, which is a real problem for hybrid hierarchical P2P networks. Because of these characteristics of real networks, it is useful to create a method that can be applied to a network to influence its structure towards a more robust, random variant. Moreover, it is of utmost importance that this method is fully distributed and is applicable at the individual node level, and that it does not require global context or understanding of the entire network.

## 4 DECLUSTERING

### 4.1 Expectation of Cooperation

Traditional strategies for P2P overlay networks depend on a high level of cooperation between peers in the network, and degrade rapidly if cooperation is insufficient. Our declustering algorithm aims to achieve a high level of functionality even at lower levels of cooperation between peers. It is based on the idea that there is an *expectation of cooperation* between peers in the network, which represents the degree to which nodes rely on, or act on, information provided by their peers. The expectation of cooperation can be thought of as the set of assumptions made during peer communication, e.g., that the information provided by other nodes is trustworthy. In general, the smaller the expectation of cooperation, the less dependence there is to exploit, and the less susceptible the network is to attack. Thus, by decreasing the expectation of cooperation between peers in the network, the robustness of the network can be improved.

Moreover, an individual node should not require a given level of cooperation from its neighbors but, rather, it should require a given level of cooperation from the network. That is, the expectation of cooperation should be not only as small as possible, but also as focused on the network as possible, rather than on a subset of the participating nodes. Figure 2




Figure 2: The minimum expectation of cooperation can be imagined as the point at which network functionality begins to degrade rapidly.

shows the traditional strategy and our proposed strategy, which achieves a high level of functionality even at lower levels of cooperation between peers. The figure shows the minimum expectation of cooperation, i.e., the point below which network functionality begins to degrade rapidly.

The inability to use more advanced search techniques that rely on a greater expectation of cooperation is partially offset in iTrust by probabilistic search techniques that make even message flooding scalable (Banaei-Kashani and Shahabi, 2003).

### 4.2 Definitions

For our declustering algorithm, we represent the network as an undirected graph, where the nodes in the graph correspond to nodes in the network and the edges in the graph correspond to connections between the nodes in the network. The degree of a node is the number of edges emanating from it. We use the following terminology in our descriptions of the declustering algorithm, the simulation, and the results.

A *neighbor* of a node is a node that is directly connected to the node, i.e., such that there exists an edge between the two nodes. The *neighborhood* of a node comprises all of the neighbors of the node, i.e., all of the nodes to which the node is directly connected. A neighborhood is a random, small subset of the membership of the iTrust network, as shown in Figure 3.

The *network view* of a node is the number of the node's neighbors plus the number of the neighbor's neighbors. Our concept of the network view is taken from Gossple (Jelasity et al., 2007; Bertier et al., 2010), where the idea is used in peer management.

A *clique* is a group of nodes that are highly connected among themselves. The *global clustering coefficient* of a network measures the "cliquishness" of the network, i.e., how common and how large the cliques in the network are. In our declustering algorithm, we use the Watts-Strogatz version of the




Figure 3: A large membership with small neighborhoods about a source node and a requesting node.

global clustering coefficient, the calculation of which is given in Figure 7.

A *hub* is a node with a significantly higher than average degree. The *hub degree* is the number of edges emanating from the hub, *i.e.*, the number of nodes to which the hub is directly connected.

The *network diameter* is the distance between the two nodes in the network that are farthest apart. More formally, the network diameter is the largest path length of all of the shortest paths in the solution for the all pairs shortest paths problem.

The *match probability* is the probability that a requesting node receives one or more responses from nodes that hold metadata that matches the keywords in its request.

### 4.3 The Declustering Algorithm

Our declustering algorithm can be used to assuage the potential problems, introduced by real networks and malicious attackers, through randomization of the neighborhoods of the nodes, *i.e.*, the connections made by the nodes. The algorithm is so named because its main purpose is to reduce the global clustering coefficient of the graphs to which it is applied. The declustering algorithm can be used by any individual node in the network, which makes it particularly useful if cooperation between nodes is expected to be minimal.

The basic idea of the declustering algorithm is presented in Figures 4 and 5. A node makes a list of all of its neighbors and all of its neighbor's neighbors and then randomly selects new neighbors from the combined list. If applied enough times and by different nodes, the desired end result is that the network will become "sufficiently random." Declustering might be seen as an attempt to de-structure the network by removing any patterns or trends that are present in it.

In the iTrust network with the declustering algorithm, we assume that there are  $N$  participating nodes

in the membership and  $n$  participating nodes in a neighborhood of a node. A source node distributes its metadata to  $m$  participating nodes in its current neighborhood, and a requesting node distributes its request to  $r$  participating nodes in its current neighborhood. If the nodes choose nodes for their neighborhoods at random and if the source nodes (requesting nodes) distribute their metadata (requests) at random to the nodes in their neighborhoods, then the metadata (requests) are distributed at random to the participating nodes in the iTrust membership. If  $m$  and  $r$  are sufficiently large with respect to  $N$ , then the probability of one or more matches is high. For example, if  $N = 1000$  participating nodes,  $n = 150$  participating nodes, the metadata are distributed to  $m = 50$  participating nodes, and the requests are distributed to  $r = 50$  participating nodes, then the probability of one or more matches is  $p = 0.928023$ , which we obtain using the formula given in (Chuang et al., 2011; Michel Lombera et al., 2011).

## 5 SIMULATION AND RESULTS

### 5.1 Metrics

To analyze the results of our simulation quantitatively, we recorded the following metrics: the maximum hub degree, the average network view, the global clustering coefficient, the average network diameter, and the match probability.

Determining the maximum hub degree is simply a matter of finding the most highly connected node in the network. The average network view is also easy to calculate by averaging the network views of every node during the declustering process. The global clustering coefficient is not as easy to calculate. We use the Watts-Strogatz version of the global cluster-

1. For any given node  $X$ , place all of  $X$ 's neighbors, and  $X$ 's neighbor's neighbors into a set  $S$ .
  - In the set  $S$ , duplicate entries are not allowed, and each node occurs only once. After the first step is complete,  $S$  is the set of all nodes that are visible to the node.
2. Remove all edges incident to  $X$ , in effect clearing its neighborhood.
3. Select  $M$  new neighbors from  $S$  without replacement, where  $M$  is the number of neighbors that node  $X$  originally had. Alternatively, randomly select each node in  $S$  with probability  $\frac{M}{|S|}$ , to obtain a binomial distribution with mean  $M$ .
  - The latter method allows each node to vary the number of neighbors it has, but to retain roughly the same number of neighbors. However, doing so leads to an increased variance in the degree distribution of the network, and is not used in our simulations.

Figure 4: The declustering algorithm.




Figure 5: Example of the declustering algorithm.

ing coefficient; it is defined as the average of the local clustering coefficients of all nodes in the network. The local clustering coefficient calculation is described in Figure 7. The experiments related to the network diameter were performed separately from those for the other metrics.

## 5.2 Simulation

Because the declustering algorithm requires a graph as input, and the structure of the graph can affect the results of the declustering, we input three different types of graphs to the algorithm multiple times, the Erdős-Rényi graph, the Barabási-Albert graph, and the Watts-Strogatz graph, shown in Figure 6.

For the hub degree, network view, clustering coefficient and match probability, we performed the following steps. First, we created the initial network graph and recorded information about it. Then, we applied our declustering algorithm to the graph in several successive passes. In the first pass, the declustering algorithm is applied to the original graph and information about the once declustered graph is recorded. In the second pass, the declustering algorithm is applied to the once declustered graph and information about the twice declustered graph is

recorded. In the third pass, the declustering algorithm is applied to the twice declustered graph and information about the thrice declustered graph is recorded.

For the network diameter, we performed separate experiments from those for the other metrics. First, we created the initial network graphs for each model and then we removed the nodes with the most connection, one-by-one, until the diameter of the network increased. We then recorded the number of nodes required to be removed before the diameter changed. This number is used as a gauge to determine the amount of work required to harm the network.

## 5.3 Results

### 5.3.1 Hub Degree, Network View, Clustering Coefficient, Match Probability

The results of the simulation of iTrust with the declustering algorithm for the hub degree, network view, clustering coefficient, and match probability are shown in Table 1. These results were obtained for an iTrust network with a membership of  $N = 1000$  participating nodes and with neighborhoods that contain  $n = 150$  participating nodes, where the metadata are distributed to  $m = 50$  nodes within the neighborhood

**Erdős-Rényi Graph** (Erdős and Rényi, 1960): Has very low clustering coefficients and is very robust to random and targeted failures. Used as the baseline.

**Watts-Strogatz Graph** (Watts and Strogatz, 1998): Has very high clustering coefficients. Used to investigate the ability of declustering to lower clustering coefficients.

**Barabási-Albert Graph** (Barabási and Albert, 1999): Node degrees follows a power law distribution, which results in the formation of a few very large hubs. Used to investigate the ability of declustering to remove hubs and smooth out the node degree distribution curve.




Figure 6: Three types of random graphs with  $n = 10$ .

1. To calculate the local clustering coefficient of node  $X$ , put all of  $X$ 's neighbors into a set  $S$ .
2. Find  $E$ , the number of possible edges between all nodes in  $S$ . For an undirected graph, this number is  $\frac{|S| \times (|S| - 1)}{2}$ .
3. Find  $e$ , the number of edges that exist between nodes in  $S$ . The local clustering coefficient for node  $X$  is given by  $\frac{e}{E}$ . Note that this quantity is always less than or equal to 1.

Figure 7: Algorithm for calculating the local clustering coefficient.

of a source node and the requests are distributed to  $r = 50$  nodes within the neighborhood of a requesting node. The table shows the results of the simulation of iTrust for three passes of the declustering algorithm for the three graphs.

First and foremost, one of the most interesting yet somewhat expected results is that the metrics for the Erdős-Rényi graph change very little despite declustering. The reason is that the declustering process very nearly emulates the construction of the Erdős-Rényi graph — it attempts to distribute edges in the graph at random. Declustering also causes the other graphs to transform slowly into Erdős-Rényi-like graphs, as is shown for the Watts-Strogatz and Barabási-Albert graphs. The global clustering coefficient of the Watts-Strogatz graph, with an edge rewiring probability of 0, is very quickly reduced. Even after a single declustering pass, its global clustering coefficient is consistent with that of the Erdős-Rényi graph.

This effect is noteworthy because of the fact that real networks tend to have larger global clustering coefficients than Erdős-Rényi graphs and, thus, can exhibit sub-optimal performance using iTrust's search and retrieval strategy, due to their increased clustering. In networks similar to the Watts-Strogatz graph, declustering not only increases the match probability of iTrust but also ensures sufficient network edge randomness to decrease the possibility of malicious attacks in the network.

In the same vein, the large hubs of the Barabási-Albert graph are a potential vulnerability despite the fact that they increase the search success rate. In this case, the ability of declustering to remove hubs and smooth the node degree distribution curve is extremely useful for increasing the robustness of the network. Real networks tend to have degree distributions that follow a power law (Adamic et al., 2001; Price, 1976), and hubs similar to those of the Barabási-Albert graphs.



Table 1: Results of the simulation of iTrust with the declustering algorithm.

	Maximum Hub Degree	Average Network View	Global Clustering Coefficient	Match Probability
<b>Erdős-Rényi Graph</b>				
Initial	192	1000	0.1502	0.9282
1st Pass	187	1000	0.1501	0.9283
2nd Pass	187	1000	0.1501	0.9282
3rd Pass	190	1000	0.1499	0.9279
<b>Watts-Strogatz Graph</b>				
Initial	150	301	0.7450	0.2858
1st Pass	187	1000	0.1506	0.9286
2nd Pass	185	1000	0.1503	0.9283
3rd Pass	180	1000	0.1501	0.9290
<b>Barabási-Albert Graph</b>				
Initial	492	1000	0.2399	0.9652
1st Pass	246	1000	0.1533	0.9297
2nd Pass	187	1000	0.1505	0.9281
3rd Pass	186	1000	0.1508	0.9283

Table 2: More results of the simulation of iTrust with the declustering algorithm.

Network Diameter	4	5	6	7	8
	Average Number of High-Degree Nodes Removed				
Erdős-Rényi Graph	270	352	374	386	394
Watts-Strogatz Graph	207	329	366	378	389
Barabási-Albert Graph	112	236	274	307	331
Barabási-Albert Graph Once Declustered	259	342	363	380	388

### 5.3.2 Network Diameter

The results of the simulation of iTrust with the declustering algorithm for the network diameter are shown in Table 2. These results were obtained for an iTrust network with a membership of  $N = 500$  nodes and with neighborhoods of  $n = 50$  nodes on average. The table shows, for each network and for network diameter between 4 and 8, the number of nodes that had to be removed before the diameter changed to the network diameter shown.

Each removal disabled the node in the network with the highest degree and removed all of its connections to other nodes. Because networks with small diameters are preferable, the results show that the structure of the Barabási-Albert graph is less robust against targeted attacks than the Erdős-Rényi graph. Moreover, the Barabási-Albert graph exhibits a noticeable improvement in robustness after only a single declustering pass. The difference in performance between these two graphs is most likely due to the uneven distribution of edges in the Barabási-Albert graph, which allows a larger proportion of edges to be removed from the network with the removal of a hub.

For the Watts-Strogatz graph, with  $N = 500$ ,  $n = 50$  and an edge rewiring probability of 0, as used in Table 1, the diameter is initially 10 due to its ring lattice structure. Therefore, for the network diameter experiments, we used an edge rewiring probability of 0.1 instead, which gave the initial network a diameter more comparable to that of the other networks. This version of the Watts-Strogatz graph ended up splitting the difference between the Barabási-Albert graph and the Erdős-Rényi graph in terms of robustness.

## 6 CONCLUSIONS

We have described a declustering algorithm for the iTrust search and retrieval network. The objective of iTrust is to provide trustworthy access to information on the Web by making it difficult to censor or filter information. The declustering algorithm decreases the expectation of cooperation between peers in the iTrust network and, thus, improves the robustness of the network. The expectation of cooperation represents the degree to which the nodes rely on, or act on, information provided by their peers.

The simulation results demonstrate that the declustering algorithm succeeds in randomizing the neighbors of a node. This randomness not only helps mitigate malicious attacks, but also allows for easier analysis of the functionality of the network. The simulation results also show that even networks with high global clustering coefficients or extremely large hubs can be transformed into Erdős-Rényi-like graphs very quickly when declustering is used. In some cases, only one pass is required to achieve the desired outcomes of lower global clustering coefficients and fewer nodes with high degrees. These findings support the idea that techniques applied on a node-by-node basis can be used to ensure certain network-wide properties in pure P2P networks, both unstructured and loosely structured.

While declustering might be useful for iTrust, and its objective of preventing censorship or filtering of information accessed over the Web, it might not be useful for P2P networks that have different objectives. The declustering technique might sacrifice potentially useful network features; however, it accomplishes its goal of making the network more robust. Subsequent versions of iTrust might use information gathered from forwarded queries to help in the declustering process. Future work in this area might investigate other techniques like declustering that work to create robust networks by supporting and promoting high levels of network churn.

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